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In this study, the impacts of Florida Department of Citrus (FDOC) orange juice (OJ) 
advertising on U.S., OJ demand and the price received by Florida growers are examined.  FDOC 
advertising is generic focusing on common attributes of OJ products such as vitamin C and other 
health factors.  The advertising is intended to increase U.S. volume sales and ultimately Florida 
grower prices.  Since OJ is a globally traded commodity, the U.S. market is analyzed in context to 
the rest of the world (ROW).  
 
The data examined include U.S. OJ gallon sales in million of single strength equivalent (SSE) 
gallons reported by FDOC; the (delivered-in) Florida grower price in dollars per SSE gallon reported 
by the United States Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistic Service (USDA-
NASS);  the  consumer  price  index  (CPI)  reported  by  the  U.S.  Bureau  of  Labor;  generic  OJ 
advertising in million of dollars (FDOC), and world OJ supply in millions of SSE gallons. World 
supply in the present analysis is comprised of U.S. and Brazil production and inventories plus a 
relatively minor amount of production from foreign suppliers sold in the U.S.  The U.S. and Brazil 
account for about 85% of the production of OJ in the world.  Annual data from the 1980-81 season 
(October-September) through the 2006-07 season were examined.  Descriptive statistics of basic 




The model is comprised of two interrelated equations.  The first equation relates U.S. gallon 
sales of OJ to price and the level of advertising, while the second equation relates the price to the 
world supply and the advertising impact of the first equation.  The first equation indicates how U.S. 
gallons sales change in response to a change in advertising.  The second equation indicates how the 
change in gallon sales due to advertising, determined from the first equation, impacts price.  Basic 
market driving forces are maintained in the model, but various assumptions are made to analyze the 
data available.  The aggregate amount of OJ in various products is treated as a single good in a world 
market.  The world market is divided into the U.S. market and ROW.  The impact of only generic 
(FDOC) OJ advertising occurring in the U.S. market is examined.
2  FDOC advertising results in 
excess demand in the U.S. market at the pre-advertising price level.  With the advertising focused on 
the U.S. market, no excess demand occurs in the ROW at this price. Given the quantity demand ed in 
the world market is the sum of the demand levels in the U.S. and ROW markets, the excess demand 
in the world market equals the excess demand in the U.S. market.  The excess demand then results in 
an increase in the world price.  Conversely, elimination of advertising caus es excess supply resulting 
in a lower price.    
 
There are various prices for OJ in the world, depending on product, location and the level in 
                                                 
1  By Mark Brown. 
2  In recent past studies, aggregate brand advertising across OJ products has not been found to have a significant 
impact on overall OJ category sales (e.g., Brown and Lee, FABA), although advertising for a specific OJ brand has 
been found to significantly enhance that brand’s demand (Brown and Lee).   2 
the marketing chain.  These prices tend to be highly correlated,
3 and it is assumed that world OJ 
supply and demand responses to prices can be approximated using a single price.  Using one price 
simplifies the analysis and avoids multicollinearity problems associated with using multiple prices.  
The question is which OJ price to use in our model.  Given the focus of this study on the impact of 
advertising on the Florida grower price, the latter grower price was chosen.
4   
 
The use of a single OJ price in modeling interactions across world OJ markets follows a 
study by McClain where the FOB Santos (Brazil) price was used as a base price and prices across 
markets differed from this base by transportation and tariff charges.  Tariffs have changed little over 
the time period studied, and what changes occurred have been phased -in, following a trend.  
Likewise, changes in transportation costs have been largely related to the trend in increased energy 
costs.  In the present study, these charges are absorbed in the intercept and trend variables of the 
model.  
 
Formally, the demand for OJ in the U.S. can be written as 
 
(1)   q1 = β10 + β11 t + β12 p +  β13A + ε1, 
 
where q1 is the quantity demanded (million gallons), t is a time trend, p is the price ($/SSE gallon), A 
is advertising (dollars), and ε1 is an error term.  Price p and advertising a are deflated by the 
consumer price index (CPI).  The β=s are coefficients to be estimated. 
 
The trend variable reflects the aggregate impact of changes in preferences over time and 
growth in the U.S. population, U.S. disposable income, and competitive beverage gallon sales, all of 
which were highly correlated with t over the time period studied.  Given that some of these factors, 
such as population and income, may positively impact OJ demand, while others, such as diet trends 
and growth in competitive beverage sales, may negatively impact demand, it is not clear what the 
sign on the trend-variable coefficient (β11) should be. 
 
 
                                                 
3  The correlation coefficients between the Florida grower price and the futures price for frozen concentrated orange 
juice (FCOJ), the Florida grower price and the Florida FOB price for bulk FCOJ, and the Florida grower price and 
the Brazil, Santos FOB price for FCOJ are .95, .97 and .90, respectively.  Differences in the correlations may  be due 
in part to the  time periods underlying the calculations.  The grower-futures correlation is based on annual data over 
the period from 1980-81 through 2006-07 (October through September); the grower-Florida FOB correlation is 
based on annual data over the period from 1988-89 through 2006-07 (October through September), and the grower-
Santos FOB correlation is based on annual Santos price data over the period from 1974 through 1997 (January 
through December) and 1997-98 through 2006-07 (July through June) versus Florida grower price data on a October 
through September season.  The lower correlation between the Florida grower price and the Santos price may be 
partly due to the less closely matched data, by time period, used in the calculation. 
4  Since advertising directly impacts consumer demand, ideally, the price in our model would be the retail price.  
Consistent data on the retail price, however, were not available for the time period studied.  However, if such data 
were available and the model were specified in terms of the retail price, examination of the impact of advertising on 
the grower price would require an additional equation relating the retail price to the grower price.  An advantage of 
directly specifying the model in terms of the grower price is that such a retail-grower price equation is not needed. 
Although not explicitly examined, consider the demand for OJ in ROW.  Formally, ROW   3 
demand can be written as  
 
(2)  q2 = β20 + β21 t + β22 p + ε2, 
 
where q2 is the quantity demanded (million gallons) and ε2 is another error term.  Equation (2) is not 
estimated but it underlies the analysis.  In the demand equation for ROW, the advertising variable 
(A), specific to the United States, is omitted, since most ROW consumers are not exposed to U.S. 
advertising.  Similar to the motivation of including t in U.S. demand equation, ROW population, 
income and time are relatively highly correlated, and the variable t is included in equation (2)as an 
approximation. The rational for using the deflated price variable p in the ROW demand equation is 
the same as in the U.S. demand equation---the CPI in the denominator of this variable reflects the 
price of other U.S. goods available in the market.  Exchange rates are not explicitly considered given 
the large number of countries in the ROW and exchange rates involved. The ROW demand equation 
is also assumed to reflect demand for (ending) OJ inventories.  
 
Letting Q be the total supply, the world supply and demand equilibrium (Q = q1 + q2) can be 
written as 
 
(3)  Q = (β10 + β20) + (β11 + β21)t + (β12 + β22) p + β13A + (ε1 + ε2). 
 
The supply Q is assumed to be exogenous, comprised of  world production plus beginning 
inventories.  The price p is endogenous, and, thus, inverting equation (3), the world inverse demand 
equation is 
 




(4b)  p = γ0 + γ1 Q + γ2 t - γ1 β13A + ε, 
 
where γ0 = - γ1 (β10 + β20), γ1 = 1/(β12 + β22), γ2 = - γ1 (β11 + β21), and  ε= -γ1 (ε1 + ε2).   
 
The error- covariance matrix for equations (1), (2) and (4b) is singular (multiplying ε1 and ε2 
by γ1 and adding the results to ε equals zero).  Dropping one of the demand equations eliminates this 
problem.  In our analysis, equations (1) and (4b) are jointly estimated using the full information 
maximum likelihood procedure (TSP).  The estimation procedure incorporates the information on 
the correlation between the error terms ε1 and ε, and corrects for the endogeneity problem in equation 
(1) where price is an explanatory variable.  
 
Note that the advertising impact β13A appears in both equations (1) and (4b).  This term 
represents the gallons sold due to advertising, price constant.  If advertising were eliminated the 
amount β13A (excess supply) would have to be moved by lowering price.  The coefficient γ1 in 
equation (4b) translates this gallon shortfall into a price impact.  Thus, the impact of advertising on 
the grower price is - γ1β13A.  The impact is expected to be positive, given the coefficients γ1 and β13   4 
are expected to be negative and positive, respectively.  The elimination of advertising is equivalent to 
an increase in supply of β13A. 
 
Estimating equation (1) and (4b) jointly takes advantage of the interrelationship between the 
quantity-advertising relationship and price-quantity relationship.  A degree of freedom is saved by 
specifying the effect of advertising through the two coefficients γ1 and β13 in equation (4b), as 
opposed to an additional joint coefficient, say γ3 = γ1β13.  The multiplicative specification involving 
the advertising and price coefficients (γ1β13) means that variations in advertising, along with 
variations in supply, help identify the inverse demand price coefficient (γ1), similar to the use of the 
Tintner-Ichimura specification in estimating the Slutsky coefficients in the Rotterdam model.    




  In preliminary analysis, current and one-year lagged levels of advertising were found to 
significantly impact U.S. demand for OJ and the grower price, equations (1) and (4b), respectively.  
Additionally, a first degree (linear) Almon polynomial lag structure was imposed with the second lag 
coefficient restricted to be zero, based on the likelihood ratio test.  Attaching subscript t to the 
advertising variable in equations (1) and (4b), the term β13At becomes β130At + β131At-1 or β130(At + 
.5At-1), imposing the zero-end-point restriction on the second lag coefficient (β132 =0 on At-2).  Thus, 
the advertising variable At is replaced by (At + .5At-1) in the model equations. 
 
Estimates of U.S. OJ demand equation (1) and grower price equation (4b) are shown in Table 
2.  Two sets of estimates are shown---the first set (unrestricted model) includes the time trend 
variable t, while the second set (restricted model) excludes this variable.  In the unrestricted model, 
the trend coefficients were not significantly different from zero at the α = .10 level or any reasonable 
level of significance.  Further, based on the likelihood ration test, the restricted model can not be 
rejected at any reasonable level (the difference in the log likelihood value between the restricted an 
unrestricted models is relatively small (footnotes a and b of Table 2); twice this difference is 
asymptotically distributed as a chi-square statistic with the degrees of freedom equal to the number 
of restrictions, two in the present case).  It thus appears that the various factors underlying the trend 
coefficient estimates (those factors that are highly correlated with t) are having offsetting effects; for 
example, possible positive effects related to such factors as growth in population and income are 
apparently  being  offset  by  possible  negative  effects  due  to  such  other  factors  as  growth  in 
competitive beverage consumption and diet trends. 
 
In the U.S. OJ demand equation (1), the coefficient on price was statistically significant and 
had a negative sign, reflecting the law of demand (the inverse relationship between quantity 
demanded and price).  In the grower price equation (4b), the coefficient on the quantity of OJ 
available in the world was also significant and negative, following the law of demand.  The estimate 
of the advertising coefficient, shared by equations (1) and (4b), was significant and positive, 
indicating that FDOC generic advertising enhanced U.S. OJ demand, and, along with the coefficient 
on supply, the grower price. 
   5 
  The model was used to determine the mean impact of advertising over the sample period 
(Table 3).  The impact of advertising on gallon sales was estimated as β14(At + .5At-1) (price 
constant), while the impact of advertising on price was estimated as - γ1β14(At + .5At-1), with the term 
At + .5At-1 set at its sample mean value  The mean impact of advertising on U.S. OJ demand with 
price constant was found to be 482 million SSE gallons, while the mean impact on the grower price 
was $.33 per SSE gallon.  The increase in price, in turn, results in a decrease in the quantity 
demanded in the U.S. market of 106 million SSE gallons (β12 dp, where dp = .33), and the overall 
impact of advertising on U.S. demand was 376 million SSE gallons (482 million gallons due to 
advertising alone minus106 million gallons due to price). 
 
  The findings of this study are relatively similar to those found by FABA (2003) and a panel 
of economists led by Ron Ward (2005).  The FABA study found that the long-run elasticity for U.S. 
OJ demand was .428 (∂q/∂A)(A/q)),and, given the FABA demand equation was linear, multiplying 
this elasticity times the present study’s mean U.S. consumption of 1309.9 million SSE gallons 
implies an average advertising impact of 560 million SSE gallons (price constant), compared to the 
482 million SSE gallons noted above.  When all the other effects, including the higher price induced 
by advertising, were considered, FABA estimated advertising increased U.S. OJ consumption by 388 
million SSE gallons, compared to the 376 million gallons estimated above. 
 
An important factor underlying the advertising impact is the price-quantity slope in the world 
market.  In the Ward et al study, this slope was estimated at -.0006 to -.0007 dollars per million SSE 
gallons, versus the -.0007 value in the present study (rounded to -.001 in Table 2).  This slope is 
multiplied by the volume advertising impact in the U.S. market to find the impact of advertising on 
price (as done above).  Hence, for each 100 million SSE gallon increase in U.S. sales due to 
advertising (price constant), the grower price increases by 6 cents or 7 cents based on the Ward et al 
findings and 7 cents based on the present findings. 
 
The above estimates of this study are based on deflating the price of OJ by the CPI in 
equations (1) and (4b).  An alternative specification of the model would be to leave the price un-
deflated (the nominal price) and include time as explanatory variable in both equations.  The deflated 
and un-deflated models are not nested, and some nonnested testing procedure is required to choose 
between the models.  In this study, the alternative specifications of equations (1) and (4b) were tested 
individually and jointly by specifying a general model that includes both the deflated and un-deflated 
hypotheses (Maddala).  The general model for equation (1) adds the nominal price and time to the 
restricted specification of the deflated model.  Appropriate restrictions on the parameters of the 
general model yield the deflated and un-deflated specifications.  Since price is endogenous, the two 
stage least squares method was used to estimate the model (the instrumental variables used were 
time, the advertising variable, total supply, the CPI and a constant).  The t and Wald tests were used 
to test the restrictions.  The results were inclusive---both models were acceptable.  A similar test was 
conducted on equation (4b).  To conduct this test, the deflated specification of this equation (the 
restricted version without time as an explanatory variable) was re-specified by multiplying both sides 
of the equation by the CPI, leaving the price un-deflated or in its nominal form.  The explanatory 
variables of this specification are the CPI, the CPI times supply and the CPI times the advertising 
variable (there is no intercept now).  The general model combines the latter specification with the un-  6 
deflated model that relates the nominal price to supply, time and the advertising variable.  The tests 
on the parameter restrictions underlying the alternative specifications were again inconclusive with 
respect to model choice (the Davidson and MacKinnon nonnested  test or J test was also conducted, 
yielding inconclusive results).  Lastly, the two general specifications of equations (1) and (4b) were 
combined and estimated by the full information maximum likelihood procedure, and the parameter 
restrictions for the deflated and un-deflated models were tested using the Wald and likelihood ratio 
tests.  Again the tests were inconclusive.  Thus, the un-deflated model deserves consideration. 
 
Estimates of the un-deflated model are shown in Table 4.  All coefficient estimates were 
significant and had expected signs.  The important price-quantity slope was -.00056, compared to the 
-.0007 slope for the deflated model mentioned above.  (The deflated model slope was actually -
.00069.)  Table 5 shows the impacts of advertising for the un-deflated model based on the sample 
mean advertising level.  For this specification, the grower price is increased by 26 cents per SSE 




The findings of this study can be used as a basis for estimating the impact of advertising on 
the grower price using more current information on the impact of advertising on gallon sales.  The 
FDOC has hired Marketing Accountability Partnership (MAP) to provide an independent estimate of 
the impact of FDOC advertising on U.S. OJ volume sales.  This estimate can be multiplied by an 
estimate  of  the  price-quantity  slope  of  equation  (4b)  to  obtain  an  estimate of the impact  of 
advertising on the grower price.  Given two defendable estimates of the price-quantity sloped are 
available (those based on the deflated and un-deflated models), the average of these two might be 
used.  This average is -.000625 per million SSE gallons.  In this case, a 100 million gallon increase 
in OJ sales due to advertising results in a 6.25 cent increase in the grower price.  After estimating the 
impact of advertising on price, grower benefits can be estimated by apply the price increase to 
grower production and comparisons to the costs of advertising can be made.   7 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of OJ Demand Variables. 
Variable  Unit  Mean  Std Dev 
U.S. Demand (q1) 
mil. SSE 
ga.  1309.90  164.41 
Grower Price (p)  $/SSE ga.
a  1.08  0.27 
Advertising (A)
a  mil. $
a  39.23  7.42 
World Supply (mil. SSE ga.) 
mil. SSE 
ga.  3118.01  874.80 
a Deflated by the CPI; in 2007 prices.       
 
 
Table 2. Full Information Maximum Likelihood Estimates of U.S. OJ Demand 
Equation (1) and Price Equation (4b), Deflated Price. 
Unrestricted Model
a 





Intercept (β10)   1285.580  297.989  4.314  [.000] 
Time (β12)  2.861  7.052  0.406  [.685] 
Price (β13)  -280.340  76.997  -3.641  [.000] 
Advertising (β14)  7.339  3.013  2.436  [.015] 
Grower 
Price 
Intercept (γ0)  3.646  0.237  15.388  [.000] 
Supply (γ1)  -0.001  0.000  -7.034  [.000] 
Time (γ1)  0.013  0.016  0.845  [.398] 
a R-squares for the U.S. OJ demand and grower price equations were .70 and 





Intercept (β10)   1369.510  137.996  9.924  [.000] 
Time (β12)         
Price (β13)  -316.122  51.439  -6.146  [.000] 
Advertising (β14)  7.614  2.910  2.616  [.009] 
Grower 
Price 
Intercept (γ0)  3.540  0.233  15.219  [.000] 
Supply (γ1)  -0.001  0.000  -11.561  [.000] 
Time (γ2)             
b R-squares for the U.S. OJ demand and grower price equations were .67 and 
.88, respectively; log likelihood value=-144.967. 
 
 
Table 3. Impacts of Advertising, Deflated Price Model, Based on the 
Mean Advertising Level. 
   Unit  Mean 
Std 
Dev 
On U.S. OJ Sales, Price Constant  mil. $
a  482.02  90.32 
On Grower Price 
$/SSE 
ga.
a  0.33  0.06 
On U.S. OJ Sales, Price Changes  mil. $
a  376.42  70.53 
   8 
 
Table 4. Full Information Maximum Likelihood Estimates of U.S. OJ Demand 
Equation (1) and Price Equation (4b), Un-deflated Price.
a 





Intercept (β10)   1046.500  245.640  4.260  [.000] 
Time (β12)  18.115  4.154  4.361  [.000] 
Price (β13)  -398.362  106.119  -3.754  [.000] 
Advertising (β14)  7.167  2.985  2.401  [.016] 
World 
Price 
Intercept (γ0)  1.939  0.175  11.067  [.000] 
Supply (γ1)  -0.001  0.000  -7.731  [.000] 
Time (γ2)  0.048  0.009  5.246  [.000] 
a R-squares for the U.S. OJ demand and grower price equations were .72 and 
.68, respectively; log likelihood value=-134.217. 
 
 
Table 5. Impacts of Advertising, Deflated Price Model, Based on the 
Mean Advertising Level. 
   Unit  Mean 
Std 
Dev 
On U.S. OJ Sales, Price Constant  mil. $
a  453.71  85.02 
On Grower Price 
$/SSE 
ga.
a  0.26  0.05 
On U.S. OJ Sales, Price Changes  mil. $
a  352.08  65.97 
 